An Interactive Theory of Power Projection: Why a Naval Power Transition Ends in Peace or War in the Periphery

My dissertation, An Interactive Theory of Power Projection: Naval Power Shift, The Contagion Effect, and Alignment Opportunity, addresses why the leading sea power shows a greater resolve to use force over a certain area, but not other areas, in its peripheral theater in response to a challenger’s power projection during a naval power transition, even at the risk of a major war. Drawing on historical comparative studies of the two Anglo-French cases (1856-1870/1882-1904) and the U.S.-Japan case (1921-1941), I develop an interactive theory of power projection to apply to current U.S.-China relations. In short, I argue that the outcome of a naval power transition is contingent upon two conditions: (1) the interactive dynamics between the geographical direction of a challenger’s expansion in peripheral regions and the leading sea power’s expectation about the resulting contagion effect on its first line of naval defense; and (2) whether alignment opportunities—shaped by third common threats and available allies in the theater of the naval arms race—are open or closed to the power considering the use of force. The contagion effect refers to three possibilities in the event of a challenger’s occupation: (1) an occupation will become a stepping stone on which a challenger further expands into the adjacent first line of maritime defense; (2) an occupation will produce a negative second-order effect on the other, possibly close or distant, first line of maritime defense; or (3) an occupation will undermine or remove local allies on the first line of maritime defense. I demonstrate that while the relative balance of resource-extraction capacities generates different preventive war motivations, it is the stated interactive dynamics that bring a conflict to the fore, or not, and determine the outcome.